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Non-technical summary
Our paper deals with the welfare and employment effects of green tax reforms. In the first part
we develop a flexible, interactive simulation model which is accessible under
http://brw.zew.de. Users can specify their own green tax reforms or emission quotas and
quantify welfare and employment effects. He or she can choose between different model
variants, e. g. closed or small open economies with or without unemployment. In the second
part we describe the numerical model specifications and explain some simulation calculations
by means of examples. Some exercises for classroom use are available on the above
mentioned web-site.
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1I. Introduction
The double or triple dividend issue is a controversially debated topic in environmental
economics. On the one hand, there are numerous theoretical papers dealing with the
environmental, welfare and employment effects of green tax reforms1. Unfortunately and
according to our experience, only very few of them can be used in public finance or
environmental economics courses at an undergraduate level, and some few more at a graduate
level. After developing and working through all the equations of a general equilibrium model,
students have to learn that analytical solutions almost never allow for clear-cut answers as to
the welfare or employment effects, i. e. the second or third dividend, of environmental tax
reforms. Furthermore, most tax scenarios considered are highly stylized and far from the
complexities of real green taxes. A second class of papers uses small or large scale
computable general equilibrium (CGE) models to evaluate the possibilities of multiple
dividends of ecological tax reforms2. These models incorporate lots of details and come up
with precise numbers concerning welfare and employment effects of introducing or changing
green taxes. Once again, these approaches can hardly be used in classroom. As a rule, and
mainly due to space constraints in scientific journals, there is neither a complete listing of the
theoretical model underlying the numerical simulation nor of the data used to calibrate model
parameters. As a consequence, CGE models come as a black box to non-expert readers.
Without knowing the theoretical model, all they can do is believe or not believe the numerical
results. Obviously, this is not the way to teach economics.
For the use in advanced undergraduate or graduate classes, we have developed a do-it-
yourself CGE simulation model which allows to examine the economic and environmental
effects of a green tax reform, implemented recently in Germany. The policy problem is briefly
described in the next section. Sections III and IV serve to explain the theoretical model and its
numerical specification. Then we will present some comparative-static results regarding the
implications of green tax reforms on employment and welfare. In this context, particular
emphasis will be put on the economic explanation of the numerical results. Limited space is
one of the reasons why only a few simulation calculations will be presented and commented
on, but there is a way to study a huge number of additional tax reform measures: readers
merely have to call our interactive simulation model under the web address http://.... On this
site we provide instructions on how to specify green tax reform packages or exogenous
emission restrictions interactively. Our simulation model – written in the GAMS3
programming language and available in the source code on the Internet – then calculates the
corresponding equilibria and shows the effects the specified tax reforms have on the wage
                                                          
1
 See, for example, Pearce (1991), Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994a, 1994b), Goulder (1995), Oates (1995),
Schneider (1997), or Bovenberg (1999).
2
 We only refer to Goulder (1992, 1994) and Bovenberg and Goulder (1996, 1997).
3
 GAMS is an acronym for Generic Algebraic Modeling System and has been developed for the analysis of
economic-engineering problems at the World Bank. Our web-site provides a short tutorial to GAMS. The
comprehensive GAMS handbook can be downloaded from the European website of the GAMS company at
http://www.gams.de.
2rate, employment, welfare, energy consumption and other key variables. However, it is the
reader’s job to accomplish the step that is decisive for the economic analysis on his own: the
economic explanation of the effects of the tax reforms he or she specified. The illustrative
examples of explanations included for selected policy scenarios in section IV provide some
orientation.
II. The Policy Problem: Energy Taxation in Germany
On April 1, 1999, the Ecological Tax Reform Law in Germany came into effect. The new law
will progressively raise the energy tax at discrete intervals, and the additional energy tax
revenue will be used to lower the contributions to pension insurance. In the first phase of the
tax reform, taxes on fuels were raised by 6 DM4 per hectoliter, heating oil by 4 DM per
hectoliter, natural gas by 0.32 DM/MWh, and electricity by 2 DM/MWh; in return, the
amount of pension contributions was reduced by 0.8 % for both employers and employees. By
now, the third phase of the ecological tax reform, which further raises taxes on mineral oil and
electricity, has taken effect.
The green tax reform aims at cutting energy consumption and reducing the associated harmful
emissions (especially CO2 emissions), but also at decreasing labor costs, thus providing
incentives to create new jobs.
Fears that the reform might jeopardize the international competitiveness of German
companies have led to far-reaching special provisions. Originally, 27 energy-intensive
industries were to be exempted from the energy taxes. But the EU-commission had
reservations about the plan, since it believed that the plan unduly favored parts of the German
production sector. Thus, direct tax exemptions were replaced by compensatory regulations for
energy-intensive companies to keep their actual tax burden constant, once a certain threshold
value is reached. The environmental effectiveness of the current tax reform is, therefore,
restricted to companies which consume less than that threshold value or have an economic
incentive to reduce their energy consumption below it.
We want to know: What is the environmental effectiveness of this tax reform? Is there a
second or a third dividend, i. e. does the green tax reform contribute to reduce excess burdens
of the tax system (2nd dividend) and does it alleviate unemployment (3rd dividend)? To answer
these questions, we develop and numerically specify a simple general equilibrium model. We
are particularly interested in a comprehensive sensitivity analysis of results with respect to
changes in the tax reform design and alternative macroeconomic hypothesis.
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 DM is the German currency unit, with a current exchange rate of 2.10 DM/$. The DM will be replaced by Euro
bills in 2002.
3III. The Theoretical Model
An appropriate analysis of the effects induced by green tax reforms requires the careful
specification of several key model elements: different energy tax rates in the private and
production sectors must be jointly represented with other initial tax distortions; the
phenomenon of unemployment needs to be endogenously explained; finally, alternative
possibilities of the use of the energy tax revenue have to be taken into consideration and
incorporated within the model.
1. Household Sector
In our model, HE  denotes the use of energy in the private sector and EΥ  the use of energy for
the production of good Y .  For simplification, we assume a representative household which
demands – besides energy HE  – an aggregate consumption good X ,  leisure F  and  a free
public good G. The utility associated with the consumption of these goods is captured by the
function ( )u X E F GH, , , , where all first partial derivatives are positive.
The overall consumption of energy in the economy ( )E EH Y+  and the accompanying
harmful emissions which cause environmental damages are represented by means of an
environmental damage function ( )v E EH Y+  with v’< 0 . It is implicitly assumed that the
connection between energy use and emissions is linear. Additive linking of the functions ( )u ⋅
and ( )v ⋅  results in the utility U of the representative household, which is:
(1)  ( ) ( )U u X E F G v E EH H Y= + +, , , .
Taking the budget constraint
(2) ( ) ( ) ( ) BKrFwFwEpXp RKwwHEX +−+−=−++ τττ 111
into account, the household chooses the quantities X, HE  and F in order to maximize its
utility U. The consumer prices for the goods X and HE  are denoted by pX and pE, w is the
wage rate, τw denotes the labor tax rate, RKτ  is the tax rate on capital income
5
 and r indicates
the interest rate. F  and  K  are given exogenously and denote the endowment with time and
capital, respectively. ( F  – F) = LS  is then the labor supply. The household receives
additional income B from transfers which will be explained later. We assume that consumers
neglect the contribution of their individual energy consumption to the overall energy
consumption ( )E EH Y+ . Of course, this assumption only makes sense if the representative
household can be considered an aggregate of many identical households. Together with the
additivity property of the utility function, the assumption ensures that the overall energy
                                                          
5
 The superscript index indicates the „residence principle“. The differentiation between a capital tax according to
the „residence principle“ and  according to the „source principle“ is only relevant in an open economy.
4consumption of the economy leaves the household decisions unaffected. The solution to the
household’s optimization problem generates demand functions for X and HE  as well as
leisure demand F (i. e. also the labor supply function), each depending on consumer prices
and household income from capital endowment ( )Kr RKτ−1  and transfers B:
(3 a – c) ( ) ( )( );,1,1,, BKrwppXX RKwEX ττ −−=      ( )E EH H= ⋅ ;     ( )F F= ⋅ .
The provision of the public good is kept constant (see equation 15) and, therefore, need not be
included as an argument of the demand function.
2.  Production Sector
We distinguish three sectors on the production side of the economy. The consumer goods
industry produces the output Y with inputs capital (KY), labor (LY) and energy (EY), subject to
the following linear-homogenous production function:
(4) ( )Y f K L EY Y Y Y= , , .
Linear-homogenous production functions also apply for domestic energy production E and the
production of the public good:
(5) ( )E f K LE E E= ,
(6) ( )G f K LG G G= , .
It would be possible to represent the use of energy as a separate production factor, but this is
not necessary for our purposes.
Within our model, we allow for the taxation of all factors. The tax rate on the use of energy in
the consumer goods sector is represented by τ E
Y ; labor and capital may get taxed at sectorally
uniform rates τ L and τKS , where the index “S” stands for “source principle”. Under perfect
competition on all goods markets, the economic rent is zero and the zero-profit condition for
each of the three production sectors is:
(7) ( ) ( ) ( )q Y w L r K q EY L Y KS Y E EY Y= + + + + +1 1 1τ τ τ
(8) ( ) ( )q E w L r KE L E KS E= + + +1 1τ τ
(9) ( ) ( )q G w L r KG L G KS G= + + +1 1τ τ .
5Here qY, qE and qG denote the producer prices. Cost-minimization generates the following
factor demand functions:
(10 a - c) ( ) ( ) ( )( )L L w r q YY Y L KS E EY= + + +1 1 1τ τ τ, , ,      ( )K KY Y= ⋅ ;     ( )E EY Y= ⋅ ,
(11 a - b) ( ) ( )( )L L w r EE E L KS= + +1 1τ τ, ,      ( )K KE E= ⋅ ,
(12 a - b) ( ) ( )( )L L w r GG G L KS= + +1 1τ τ, ,      ( )K KG G= ⋅ .
It would also be possible to work on a per capita basis and to derive factor demand functions,
as well as supply functions for goods from profit-maximization.
The relationships between producer and consumer prices for energy and the aggregate
consumer good are given by:
(13 a - b) ( )p qX C Y= +1 τ  ;     ( )( )p qE C EH E= + +1 1τ τ
where τC  represents a uniform consumption tax rate and τ E
H
 the tax on energy consumption
by private households.
The tax base of the consumption tax, thus, includes the energy tax.
3. Public Sector
In a static model, current expenditure and tax revenues of the public sector have to be equal.
The budget equation is:
(14) BGqG +  = ( )[ ] ( )FFwEqXq wHHEEYC −+++ τττ 1
+ ( ) ( ) KrKKKrLLLw RKGEYSKGEYL τττ ++++++
+ YE
Y
EHE
H
E EqEq ττ + .
The left hand side of this equation shows the expenditure for the provision of public goods
and the transfers to households. The terms on the right hand side correspond to the
government revenues from the general consumption tax, the labor income tax, from taxes on
the use of labor and from the capital income tax according to the source and the residence
principle, as well as from the tax on the energy consumption of private households and on the
use of energy for the production of consumer goods. Finally, for simplicity we assume that the
public good is provided at a constant quantity:
6(15) G G= .
4. Market Equilibrium Conditions
The formulation of the market equilibrium conditions depends on the foreign closure of the
model (closed economy versus small open economy) and the specification of the labor market
(full employment versus unemployment). Below, the associated four different variants will be
discussed. Our paper puts emphasis on the basic understanding of economic mechanisms. By
comparing the four different model variants, the dependence of  results on the models’
structural assumptions becomes clear. Table 1 summarizes the key settings for the model
variants.
Table 1: Classification of model variants
Full Employment (FE) Unemployment (UE)
Closed Economy (CE) CE-FE CE-UE
Small Open Economy (SOE) SOE-FE SOE-UE
In the following sections, we will discuss the market equilibrium conditions for the different
model specifications.
a) CE-FE
Market equilibrium for the closed economy with full employment is determined by the
following set of equations:
(16) Y X=
(17) E E EH Y= +
(18) K K K KY E G= + +
(19) ( ) ( )LLLLFFL GEYS ≡++=−≡  
In equation (19) LS denotes the labor supply and L the labor demand.
7According to Walras’ Law, we can drop one of the market equilibrium conditions and fix one
price as a numeraire. We ignore the capital market equilibrium condition (18) and set the
interest rate r equal to 1.
b) SOE-FE
For the small open economy, we assume that capital is mobile across domestic borders and
that energy can be traded internationally while the consumer goods X can not. With respect to
taxation of energy consumption, the destination principle applies. Equations (17) and (18)
must then be replaced by the following balance of payments condition:
(20) ( ) ( )q E E E r K K K KE H Y Y E G− − + − − − = 0.
The first term on the left hand side concerns the trade balance and the second term
summarizes the capital income flows between the domestic economy and abroad, which are
reported in the balance of services. In equilibrium, the trade deficit (trade surplus) must equal
the inflow (outflow) of capital income. Full employment is still characterized by equation
(19). In the small open economy, the prices of traded goods and factors, i.e. qE and r, are
exogenously determined on the world markets. Note that equation (20) is automatically
fulfilled as a consequence of Walras’ Law.
c) CE-UE and SOE-UE
One objective of the green tax reform is the reduction of unemployment. In the relevant
literature, this potential effect is often referred to as “second" or "third dividend”. In both of
our unemployment model variants (indicated by the suffix “-UE”), we will investigate the
impact of the green tax reform on the level of unemployment. We introduce unemployment
through the specification of a “wage curve”, which postulates a negative relationship between
the real wage rate and the rate of unemployment:
( )w
P
g ur= with 0<′g ,
where P denotes a consumer goods price index
(21) ( )P P p pX E=   ,
and ur ( ( ) SS LLL /−≡ ) is the unemployment rate. This type of wage curve can be derived
from trade union wage models, as well as from efficiency wage models (see e. g. Hutton and
Ruocco, 1999).
8Figure 1 illustrates the wage curve in the traditional labor market diagram (rather than in the
−− Pwur / space). The real wage rate w/P is measured on the vertical axis and the labor
supplied and demanded are measured on the horizontal axis.
Figure 1: Wage curve and unemployment
Full employment occurs with the real wage rate of (w/P)0 at the intersection of the (inverse)
labor demand function L and the labor supply function LS. The wage curve now replaces the
labor supply curve. Consequently, the equilibrium wage rate (w/P)1 lies above the market
clearing wage rate. This causes unemployment at an amount of ( ) ( )11 LLS − .
Taking taxes and unemployment benefits into account, the wage curve can be specified
stating a negative relationship between the unemployment rate ur and the net wage rate:
( )Burg
P
w
,=
ρ
with ′ <g 0 ,
where:
L
w
τ
τρ
+
−
≡
1
1
.
real
wage
wage
curve
labor
unemployment
9The resulting expression ( )ρ−1  indicates the tax wedge between the employers’ gross wage
costs and the employees’ net wages.
Instead of equation (19), the following equilibrium condition for the labor market then
applies:
(22) ( )urLL S −= 1 .
In our model variants with unemployment, we interpret the transfers to the private household
sector which enter their budget equation as unemployment benefits. Following Koskela and
Schöb (1999), the employment effects of a green tax reform depend crucially on the form of
these transfer payments. Here we assume that the unemployment benefit payments Br  are
constant in real terms and are not taxed. The relationship between nominal and real
unemployment benefits is given by:
 (23) B PB L urr S= .
With these assumptions, we obtain a simple specification of the wage curve as a log-linear
function (Hutton and Ruocco, 1999, p. 273):
(24) ( ) ργγ logloglog 10 −+=


ur
P
w
where γ0 is a positive scale parameter and γ1 < 0 indicates the elasticity of the real wage with
respect to the unemployment rate. Real unemployment benefits are included in the parameter
0γ .
If the household gets rationed on the labor market, the budget restriction changes in so far as
the actual net wage income is determined by ( )Lw wτ−1  and no longer by ( )( )w F Fw1− −τ .
Determination of welfare effects is also based on enforced (rather than voluntary) leisure
consumption. The details of welfare measurement for rationed goods can be found in
Johansson (1987, chapter 5). In our model variants with full employment, we also assume
transfers in real terms. These, however, are constant and do not vary with the rate of
unemployment. Equation (23) simply becomes:
(25) B PBr= .
For the sake of transparency, let us summarize at the end of this section once more which
variants of the model are specified through which equations, and which variables are to be
determined endogenously.
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All variants of the model have 18 equations and 18 endogenous variables in common. These
are equations (3a-c), (4), (5), (6), (10a-c), (11a-b), (12a-b), (13a-b), (14), (15), (21), and
variables X, EH, F, Y, E, G, LY, KY, EY, LE, KE, LG, KG, pX, pE, P as well as the endogenous
equal-yield tax rate, for example τw. Table 2 provides an overview of the additional equations
and variables that are model-specific.
Table 2: Model-specific equations and variables
FE UE
CE (16), (17), (19), (25) (16), (17), (22), (24), (23)
qX, qE, w, B qX, qE, w, ur, B
SOE (19), (25) (22), (24), (23)
w, B w, ur, B
IV. Numerical Model Specifications
Analytically, the economic and environmental implications of a green tax reform can be
studied in a comparative-static framework. For example, one could derive the total
differentials of the market equilibrium conditions and solve this system of equations for the
relative changes in the variables of interest. This is the normal procedure employed in the
theoretical literature (see e.g. Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994a,b) or Schneider (1997)).
Although our model is a radical simplification of the real economy, it is still so complicated
that an analytical solution would not deliver any results for a sound economic interpretation.
Simulation analyses on a numerical basis provide an alternative. For this type of analysis, we
must first specify the concrete functional forms for the utility function  and the cost functions,
and fix the values of the model parameters as well as of the exogenous variables. A specific
data set then corresponds to a specific benchmark equilibrium. Within the policy simulations
single parameters or exogenous variables are changed and a new (counterfactual) equilibrium
is computed. Comparison of the counterfactual and the benchmark equilibrium then yields
information on the policy-induced changes of economic variables such as employment,
production, welfare, relative prices, etc.
11
In general, there are two approaches for the model parameterization. On the one hand, one
could take exogenous values for all parameters and exogenous variables and then solve the
system of non-linear equations for the benchmark equilibrium. However, for the same set of
parameter values one would determine four different benchmark equilibria - one for each
variant of the model. Taking the different benchmark equilibria as starting (reference) points,
one would then perform numerically one (or more) comparative-static simulations. Yet, a
cross-comparison of results for the different variants with respect to some tax reform measure
would then hardly make sense. For this reason, another approach will be adopted here. We
assume that the same benchmark equilibrium underlies all of our four model variants. In
principle, one could construct such a benchmark equilibrium from the national accounts and
other statistics (such as input-output tables) of the benchmark year. In this paper, we are not
interested in the explanation of observed data, but in the better understanding of economic
mechanisms. For this purpose, it is sufficient simply to employ stylized data as provided by
Table 3.
If the benchmark equilibrium is the same for all model variants, they must differ from each
other in other ways. By definition, the benchmark equilibrium must correspond to the
numerical solution for each model variant. This is guaranteed by a sufficiently large number
of parameters, which are endogenously determined for each variant, so that the quantities and
prices of the benchmark equilibrium are replicated with these parameters as the numerical
solution of the respective model variant. In the literature this procedure is called calibration
(see e.g.  Mansur and Whalley, 1984). Typically, the number of all model parameters is larger
than the number of model equations, and we will have to fix the remaining "free" parameters
(e. g. elasticities of substitution across inputs in production).
Table 3 describes our benchmark equilibrium in terms of a social accounting matrix (King
1985). The upper section contains the benchmark prices and tax rates, the lower section
reports the benchmark quantities, labor income tax revenues and transfers.
For the sake of transparency, we have indicated the equation references (see section III) for
the market equilibrium conditions associated with the rows (market clearance) and columns
(zero profit for production sectors, income balance for household and government) on the
edges of the social accounting matrix. In general, data consistency of a social accounting
matrix requires that the sums of each of the rows and columns equal zero.
Note that the benchmark equilibrium given in Table 3 is the same for all four variants of the
model developed in section III. This means that there is no trade at the benchmark for the
small open economy. Exports and imports of capital and goods will then only be induced
when tax reform measures are undertaken. In the model variant with unemployment, the value
at the intersection of the "L"-row and the "Household"-column indicates rationed labor supply
(see equation (24)).
12
Table 3: Prices and quantities in the benchmark equilibrium
Prices
q q q r wX Y E= = = = = 10.
Tax Rates
τ τ τ τ τ τC L K
R
K
S
E
H
E
Y
= = = = = = 0
Social Accounting Matrix
Y E G Household Government Eq.-No.
CE-FE
X – 25 25 (16)
E 5 – 15 10 (17)
G – 8 8 (15)
L 14 10 3 – 27 (19)
K 6 5 5 – 16 (18)
TW 9 – 9
B – 1 1
Eq.-No. (7) (8) (9) (2) (14)
The utility and production functions have yet to be specified. In principle, there is the choice
among various functional forms which just have to exhibit certain mathematical properties
(we will not elaborate on these here). In most of the relevant literature, however, the
functional forms employed belong to the type of constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES)
functions. Such functions have certain mathematical properties (regularity) that ease the
numerical analysis considerably, but are still flexible enough to allow for the appropriate
representation of economic behavior. Table 4 summarizes our choices of functional forms.
The utility function is represented by a so-called “utility tree”. At the bottom level, we
aggregate the consumption of the goods X and EH to an aggregate consumption good C, which
13
is then combined with leisure demand F at the top level. The resulting utility function is
weakly separable in goods X and EH, and leisure F. Both “utility branches” are represented by
CES functions. The parameters piC and piU correspond to the substitution elasticities between X
and EH, and between C and F, respectively; in illustrative terms, these elasticities indicate the
curvature of the indifference curve in the X-EH space as well as in the C-F-space. The
parameters βC and βF are called share parameters. Because the provision of the public good
was assumed to be constant, it can be omitted from the utility function u(⋅) without loss of
relevant information. The equation for the consumer price index follows from the underlying
CES utility function over X and EH. Also, we employ CES-functions to characterize the
production functions. In the production of the consumption good, capital and labor are
combined at the bottom level to yield value-added Q (KY, LY), whereas at the top level value-
added Q and intermediate energy EY are combined to yield output Y. The substitution
elasticities are represented here with σ, and the share parameters with α, where the indices in
subscript refer to the production sector.
The environmental damage function is given by the lower section of Table 4. The concrete
functional form (which has no empirical foundation) has been specified in such a way that the
implied marginal damage function (-v´) is linear and exhibits a positive gradient. Finally, we
provide the wage curve which has already been stated in equation (24).
In addition to the functional forms, the above mentioned “free” parameters, as well as the
values for the exogenous variables of the model, must be determined. This must be done
carefully. On the one hand, the CES functions turn into a Cobb-Douglas specification for
certain parameter values (this applies to piC = 1 or σ = 1, for example), and this must be taken
into consideration with respect to the analytical formulation. On the other hand, certain
parameter combinations may not lead to solutions at all, or just deliver solutions which do not
make sense from an economic point of view.
The values for parameters or exogenous variables, specified in the last row and column of
Table 4, were selected so that the benchmark equilibrium in Table 3 exhibits economically
meaningful characteristics. One example would be that the labor supply elasticity with respect
to the real wage rate takes on a plausible value.6 Another example for the reasonable choice of
values would be that the economy in the benchmark equilibrium is on the rising branch of the
Laffer-curve. Although the free parameter values for all four models are identical, the
remaining parameters for each model are calibrated so that the solution of the numerically
specified theoretical model replicates the benchmark equilibrium shown in Table 3.
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 We have chosen a value of 0.2 for the labor supply elasticity at the benchmark, which, although a little high, is
not implausible.
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Table 4: Functional forms and values for the free parameters
Functional Form Parameter Values
Utility Function
( )( )u C X E F , , ( )[ ]( )
C X EX X H
C C
C C
C C
C
= + −
= −
β β
pi pi
pi pi1 1 11
1
/ / /
/
Ω Ω
Ω
Ωmit C
( )[ ]
( )
u C FC C
u u u
u u
u
u
u
= + −
= −
β β
pi pi
pi pi1 1 11
1
/ / /
/
Ω Ω
Ω
Ωmit 
piC = 11.
piu = 0884.  (calibrated)
Consumer goods price
index
( )P p pX E , ( )[ ]P p pX X X E
C C C= + −− − −β βpi pi pi1 1
1
11
Production function
( )E f K LE E E= ,
( )G f K LG G G= ,
( )( )Y f Q K L EY Y= , ,
( )[ ]
( ) EEE
EEEE
EEEEE LKE
σσθ
αα
θθσθσ
/1  where
1
/1/1/1
−=
−+=
( )[ ]
( ) GGG
GGGG
GGGGG LKG
σσθ
αα
θθσθσ
/1  where
1
/1/1/1
−=
−+=
( )[ ]
( ) QQQ
YQYQ
QQQQQ LKQ
σσθ
αα
θθσθσ
/1  where
1
/1/1/1
−=
−+=
( )[ ]
( ) YYY
YYY
YYYYY EQY
σσθ
αα
θθσθσ
/1  where
1
/1/1/1
−=
−+=
σ E = 08.
σG = 0 98.
σQ = 0 68.
σY = 0 7.
Environmental damage
function ( )u E u A E= − γ2
2
A = =10 01, .  γ
Wage curve
w
P
g ur
θ
= ( )
log log( ) logw
P
ur
  = + −γ γ θ0 1 γ 1 0 5= .
Exogenous variable
  ;8G   ;16 ==K  5.47=F (calibrated - full employment case)
 5.52=F (calibrated - unemployment case with initial ur = 0.1)
15
V. Simulation Results and Economic Interpretation
1. First, Second and Third Dividend of a Green Tax Reform
In this section, we will present and discuss our simulation results. In doing so, it is important
to remember that the exact numerical values have no major meaning. For this reason, we will
draw only qualitative conclusions based on the numerical results. We will see that some
insights are rather surprising. This is precisely the advantage of our simulation model: through
comparative-static exercises we gain qualitative (general) insights that could hardly be
derived at by analytical manipulations, no matter how tricky they might be.
Numerical results and interpretations for certain tax reforms will be discussed in more detail
only for the model variants CE-FE and CE-UE (closed economy with full employment and
closed economy with unemployment). The other model variants - SOE-FE and SOE-UE -
could be analyzed parallel to this. It is also possible to investigate further tax reform packages
for each of these model variants. We will leave this up to the interested reader. In this paper,
we are only offering the general tools and the instructions, and illustrate along some examples
how to gain economic insights using our simulation model. The rest will have to be done by
the reader himself. This is, after all, a do-it-yourself simulation model.
It should be the primary goal of a green tax reform to achieve positive environmental effects,
e.g. via the reduction of harmful emissions from fossil fuel combustion. This effect will be
called the first dividend (D1) of a green tax. In addition to that, a green tax reform is said to
have other positive effects. Supporters of a green tax reform hope for a “better” and more
efficient tax system due to the swap of green taxes for existing distorting taxes. The literature
refers to this as second dividend (D2). Finally, it is believed that employment gains could be
achieved if the tax revenue is used to reduce the tax burden on labour. In the case of positive
employment effects, a green tax would then cause a third dividend (D3).
Based on our simulation model, one can identify under which conditions one or more of these
dividends will occur.  The dividends have to be quantified, i.e. measured. This will be easiest
with respect to the employment effects. In this context, the third dividend is simply calculated
as the change in the employment rate in percentage points. For example, would the
unemployment rate be reduced from 10 per cent in the benchmark equilibrium ( ur = 0.1) to 8
per cent ( ur = 0.08) due to a green tax reform, the accounted value for D3 would be “-2.000”.
Unemployment would be reduced by 2 percentage points. Similarly, a value of “1.500” for D3
would imply an increase in unemployment by 1.5 percentage points.
Methodologically clear, however, conceptionally more difficult is the measurement of the
second dividend of a green tax reform. In the public finance literature, the efficiency
properties of a tax system are picked up by the the so-called excess burden. The latter can be
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calculated by using the Hicksian equivalent variation. With revenue neutral tax reforms – we
restrict ourselves to those – the excess burden corresponds to the income change (in units of
the numéraire good), which a representative consumer has to bear, due to the tax reform. The
second dividend is positive if it improves the income situation.
The measurement of the first dividend is problematic. The taxation of energy should lead to a
reduced energy consumption and, therefore, to a reduction in harmful emissions. For
simplicity we assume a constant relationship between pollutants and energy consumption. The
first dividend could then simply be defined as the percentage change of the overall energy
consumption of  domestic households and production. This setting reflects the prevailing
public focus in the policy debate on concrete emission reduction targets. In the context of its
climate protection program, Germany has accepted the liability to reduce CO2 emissions by
25 per cent until 2005 (compared to 1990 emission levels). We will speak of  D1(P) when
having this interpretation of the first dividend in mind, where P stands for a percentage
reduction in quantity. A value of  “-10.000” would indicate a 10 percent reduction of the
domestic energy consumption. The reduction of harmful emissions, which is closely
connected to the reduction of energy consumption, is not an end in itself. After all, there is an
optimal environmental pollution and further reductions of harmful emissions would result in a
welfare reduction. What really matters are the welfare effects of a change in harmful
emissions. Due to the lack of exact empirical information on damage functions and the
valuation of environmental damages, welfare effects can hardly be determined empirically.
We have assumed a simple - and admittedly a somewhat arbitrary -  environmental damage
function ( )v E EH Y+ to show that welfare effects, not quantity effects, matter. The first
dividend, measured by the welfare effects of the environmental policy, is characterized by the
notation D1(W) (W for welfare). Note that D1(W) and D1(P) are connected via a monotonous
transformation.
The HEV can be broke down into two components for our utility function:
(26)
The index j represents the counterfactual equilibrium after the tax reform, and the index 0
indicates the benchmark equilibrium. INC0 is the "maximum" income in the benchmark, this
means
(27) ( ) ( )INC w F r K Bw KR0 0 0 0 01 1 0= − + − +τ τ .
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Due to its affinity to the tenets of taxation in public finance, D2 can be called the public
finance aspect of a green tax reform. Accordingly, D3 and D1 are representing the
employment and environmental aspects. D3 is actually not an independent aim but part of the
welfare aim. Since D3 plays a very important role in the political debate – in contrast to D2 -
it is accounted for separately. That way it can be determined, whether D3 and D2 always
work in the same direction or whether they bear conflicting targets.
2. Model simulations
Our simulation model is accessible under http://brw.zew.de, where the interested reader will
find a detailed instruction as well.
Before we investigate the results of a green tax reform with the help of our numerical model,
we would like to point out some fundamental restrictions with respect to our quantitative
investigations. One never knows if the numerical results are correct. It must be assumed, of
course, that the solutions are correct in formal terms, but a wrong model (i.e. wrongly
specified with respect to the underlying economics) may have been solved. A small
programming error (that can easily creep in) is enough to cause such a dilemma. All this gives
rise to more than the usual carefulness with regard to the acceptance and interpretation of
simulation models. One may overcome this problem, though, in the following way: as a rule,
those policy measures should be simulated first – as a consistency check, so to speak – where
qualitative results are already known based on rigorous theroretical analysis. If the simulation
model produces different results, it is safe to assume that it is mis-specified. Otherwise, one
can proceed with the analysis of reform packages, where results are open in theory. Of course,
one can still not be sure that the numerical solutions are “correct”. Therefore it is very
important that all numerical results can be convincingly explained in economic terms.
a) Consistency Tests
In this section three consistency tests shall be explained. Best for this purpose are the model
variants with full employment (CE-FE, SOE-FE) because the economic intuition is
straightforward. The results of the following tax reforms are theoretically non-ambiguous: if
the income tax is supplemented with a payroll tax in a revenue-neutral way, the equilibrium
values for all quantitative variables remain unchanged. The wage rate merely adjusts, so that
the gross wages and the net wages each are identical before and after the tax reform. From the
theory of tax incidence we know that it is irrelevant for the equilibrium values of the CE-FE
variant who actually pays the tax. What matters is who bears the tax burden. As long as the
tax wedge θ on the labor market remains unchanged, it makes no difference if the tax is levied
on households or producers.
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Secondly, we replace the income tax levied in the benchmark equilibrium with respect to the
model variants CE-FE and SOE-FE by a tax on the domestic capital stock  (i.e. the capital
incomes resulting from that) or by a uniform consumption tax. From a theoretical point of
view, the results are obvious as well. The taxation of labor income induces distortions on the
labor market. These can be completely avoided by switching to the taxation of (domestic)
capital income. As the latter is constant (fixed capital endowment) in our static model, a
capital income tax works as a lump-sum tax; in other words, capital income taxes are first-
best when we only consider the welfare component D2. Since the distortions on the labor
market are reduced, employment, disposable income, consumption demand and overall
production rise. As a consequence, the production of energy also rises along with pollutants,
resulting in a negative D1(W) and a positive D1(P).
Optimal taxation theory suggests that a general consumption tax would be second best in the
case of homothetic and weakly separable utility functions. Under welfare aspects (with
respect to D2), the general consumption tax is superior to a labor income tax, because the
burden of the general consumption tax does not only fall on labor income, but also on
(constant) capital income. When switching from the labor income tax to a general
consumption tax, part of the tax burden is shifted to fixed capital income. A general
consumption tax, hence, corresponds to a labor income tax combined with a lump-sum tax.
The distortions on the job market decline, employment rises and so does energy production.
The latter induces a decline in D1 as compared to the benchmark equilibrium, but this decline
is smaller than it would be for the case of an exclusive capital income tax.
Finally, the exogenous aim of a reduction of overall energy consumption is assumed, just like
the German government attempts to do within the framework of the climate protection
program. The first dividend D1(P) is now given, and therefore D1(W) is fixed as well. For the
enforcement of the reduction target, energy consumption in the household and in the
production sector should be taxed. It is left open for discussion whether it is advantageous to
reach the given emission reduction via an uniform or differentiated energy tax. The decision
making criterion lies solely in the change in D2, since D1 is fixed by assumption.
From a theoretical point of view, the result is obvious if in addition to the taxes, which aim at
the achievement of the environmental target, first best taxes or transfers are available in order
to finance the public good or to refund energy taxes to private households. In that case, energy
consumption of the private and production sector should be taxed with equal rates (Pigouvian
tax). While the first dividend is positive in welfare terms (D1(W)>0) - which is the main
purpose of an energy tax - the second dividend is negative, because these taxes cause
allocative distortions in consumption and production. Uniform energy tax rates for the
implementation of emission reduction targets are even then unambiguously optimal if the
budget account is balanced by a general tax on consumption, which is second best, instead of
a first best taxation of the domestic capital stock.
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b) Green Tax Reform in the Case of  Full Employment: Energy Taxes versus Income
Taxes
The economic effects of  revenue neutral tax reforms are not very surprising if, in return to the
introduction of energy taxes, first best or second best taxes are reduced. Positive
environmental effects are counterbalanced by the negative impacts on the excess burdens of
the tax system and unemployment. The question of the impact of a green tax reform on
welfare and employment becomes exciting not until third best worlds are taken into
consideration. Income taxes are third best taxes in our model. With regard to the excess
burdens which are caused, they are definitely inferior when compared to first best taxes on the
given capital stock and second best general consumption taxes.
In this section we are going to present and explain some simulation calculations when energy
taxes are introduced and taxes on the factor labor are reduced. This is analogue to the
expected gains from the German Ecological Tax Reform that came into effect on April 1,
1999. For a better understanding we restrict our focus on the model variant of a closed
economy with full employment. In such a scenario it is not important whether the income
taxes are tied up to the labor supply or to the labor demand. In the following section we will
include the impacts of a green tax reform on unemployment as well.
Primarily, energy taxes should trigger a cutback on the consumption of energy accompanied
by a reduction of harmful emissions. A difference has to be made as to whether an emission
reduction target is pursued or not. We will consider both cases. With the simulation runs
shown in the first part of Table 5, energy tax rates are fixed exogenously, and the reduction of
the energy consumption results endogenously. The stated tax rate combinations have been
chosen in such a way that they approximately generate the same energy tax revenue.
In the second part of Table 5, we look at given emission reduction target of 5 and 15 per cent
alternatively. Those emission reduction targets should be achieved either through uniform or
through different energy tax rates for the household and the production sector. In order to do
so we fix the ratio of the energy tax rate equal to 1 (equal tax rates), to 0.5 and to 1.5. A value
of 0.5 (1.5) means that the energy tax rate in the production sector is half (1.5 times) of that in
the household sector. The absolute level of the energy tax rates, as well as of the wage rates
necessary for a balanced budget, results endogenously. The lower part of Table 5 contains the
simulation results. First of all we will interpret the results for exogenously fixed energy tax
rates. We can see that all three of our chosen tax rate combinations exhibit a double dividend.
The total energy consumption is reduced by somewhat 5 per cent. At the same time, excess
burdens are reduced. With regard to the second dividend, the tax rate combinations of
τ E
Y
= 19  and τ EH = 13 turn out to be best. An even wider spread of the tax rate is just as
useless as an equal taxation of the energy consumption in the household and in the production
sector.
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Table 5: Unifom versus differentiated energy taxes: environmental effects and excess burden (GV-VB)
Endogenous Variable
D1(P) = 5 D1(P) = 15
( )τ τEY EH; = ( )τ τEY EH/ = ( )τ τEY EH/ =
(15;15) (19;13) (21;11) 1.5 0.5 1.0 1.5
Results
D1(P) – 5.808 – 5.435 – 4.911 τ EY 17.777 23.887 42.346 58.496
D1(W) 1.302 1.221 1.106 τ EH 11.851 47.774 42.346 38.997
D2 0.094 0.098 0.096 D2 0.098 – 0.195 – 0.136 – 0.155
MWC ( )τ EY – 0.00870 – 0.00898 – 0.00917 MWC ( )τ EY – 0.00898 – 0.00802 – 0.00882 – 0.00947
MWC ( )τEH – 0.00916 – 0.00897 – 0.00882 MWC ( )τEH – 0.00893 – 0.01083 – 0.01014 –0.00970
MWC ( )τ w – 0.00895 – 0.00897 – 0.00901 MWC ( )τ w – 0.00901 – 0.00827 – 0.00822 – 0.00818
21
The crucial question, however, is how these results can be interpreted in an economically
convincing way. First we need to explain why low energy tax rates generate a double
dividend, and why the energy consumption of the production sector should be taxed more
heavily than that of the private sector. Both results are surprising at first sight. Having studied
the production efficiency theorem by Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) one would expect that
distorting taxes in production should be abstained from altogether. However, this result
applies to a second-best tax system only - a condition that is not satisfied in the scenarios
described in Table 5. In our third best system of a labor income tax efficiency gains can occur
due to an intentionally induced distortion in the production sector.
This leaves us to explain the amount and the direction of the differentiation of the tax rates.
In order to do so we revert to the marginal cost concept of public funds (MCF); see Schöb
(1994) or Snow and Warren (1996). Starting from the newly calculated equilibrium, we raise
the public expenditures for goods by a marginal unit and finance the additional public
expenditures with various tax instruments available in the respective model set-up. The
marginal costs of public funds then specify the costs for the overall economy, which are
connected with additional public expenditures for goods by one unit. Accordingly, a value of
(-1.05) would mean that 1 additional dollar tax revenue would cause overall economic costs
of 1.05 dollars. The costs of 0.05 dollar, which accrue on top of the 1 dollar revenue effect,
correspond to the marginal welfare cost of public funds (MFC + 1) = MWC. The structure of
tax rates should be chosen in such a way that for each tax MCF or respectively MWC are the
same. This means that the rates for taxes with low (high) MWCs should be raised (lowered).
Our simulation program calculates the MWCs mechanically. The last three rows of Table 5
show the respective MWC-values. According to public finance aspects, the tax rate
combination of (19;13) in addition to a third best income tax is optimal because the MWCs
just coincide.
In the second part of Table 5 exogenously given emission reduction targets are analyzed. With
a moderate reduction target of 5 per cent (with respect to the overall energy use) a double
dividend can also be achieved if the energy tax rates are suitably differentiated. With stricter
reduction targets, such as 15 per cent, this is no longer the case. The resulting energy tax rates
are so high that the excess burden of the whole tax system would increase (negative D2).
Indeed, in that case, uniform energy tax rates would be better than differentiated ones. The
economic explanation is that with stricter reduction targets, the environmental objective
dominates the public finance objective of minimizing the excess burden. The pursuit of
environmental objectives is, thus, best achieved by uniform energy and emission tax rates.
The MWCs are given in Table 5 but do not provide any further information with respect to the
differentiation of the tax rates. This is so because these indicators merely reflect the public
finance marginal excess burden of the tax system but not the dominating environmental
objective.
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c) A Green Tax Reform with Unemployment
Next to the reduction of harmful emissions, the relief of the tax burden on labor and the
resulting employment gains represent further important objectives of the green tax reform.
Table 6 describes the results of some simulation runs in a closed economy with
unemployment (CE-UE). In the left part of Table 6 energy tax rates are again fixed
exogenously, and in the right part of the Table we can observe the effects of a given reduction
target of 15 per cent. In practice, the revenues of a green tax reform are used to reduce the tax
on the productive use of labor.
The simulations presented in Table 6 show that a green tax reform is able to create three
dividends simultaneously. In all cases considered here three positive effects can be realized:
firstly, energy consumption is curtailed and, therefore, harmful emissions are reduced as well;
secondly, the efficiency of the tax system is improved due to a reduction of the excess burden
and finally, positive employment effects can be observed, i.e. unemployment is reduced.
The examination of Table 6 shows that energy tax rates should be higher in the case of
unemployment as opposed to the case with full employment, if the degree of differentiation is
comparable. If the productive use of energy is taxed at 19 per cent – as done in Table 5 – but
the energy use of private households at 13 per cent on the other hand, the MWCs of labor
income taxes turn out higher than those of the energy taxes. It should be noted that, due to
concurrent MWCs under a public finance point of view, the structure of the energy tax rates is
chosen correctly. Thus, it is appropriate to raise the energy tax rates with an unchanged degree
of differentiation and to reduce the income tax.
With reference to D2, the optimal tax rate combination will be reached  at 35 and 23 per cent.
Given such tax rates, unemployment will be reduced by 1.36 percentage points while overall
energy consumption is reduced by 8.5 per cent.
The second part of Table 6 shows that an ambitious reduction target of 15 per cent is
compatible with public finance as well as employment objectives. While public finance
considerations lead to uniform energy tax rates, employment aspects demand a higher tax on
the productive use of energy. Due to the higher energy tax revenues, which are induced by the
latter, the tax wedge on the labor market could be reduced even further.
The positive employment effects of energy taxes are explained by our model in such a way
that, with a simultaneous reduction of labor taxes, the tax burden on labor is passed on to
other factors, i.e. earners of other incomes. Because unemployment transfers are assumed
constant in real terms, the green tax reform shifts the tax burden partly onto capital causing a
reduction of the real interest rate.
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Table 6: Effects of energy taxes on environment, excess burden and employment (GV-UB)
Endogenous Variable
D1(P) = 15
( )τ τEY EH; = ( )τ τEY EH/ =
(19;13) (35;23) 0.5 1.0 1.5
Results
D1(P) – 4.815 – 8.488 τ EY 25.790 45.947 63.687
D2 0.326 0.389 τ EH 51.579 45.947 42.458
D3 – 0.902 – 1.359 τ w 13.788 11.683 10.076
MWC ( )τ EY – 0.01095 – 0.01116 D2 0.142 0.242 0.237
MWC ( )τEH – 0.01091 – 0.01113 D3 – 1.624 – 1.788 – 1,874
MWC ( )τ w – 0.01186 – 0.01114
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The results cannot be generalised without restrictions. It is easy to find tax reform scenarios
which are more advantageous than a green tax reform with respect to D2 and D3. And it can
be shown that a green tax reform causes a higher excess burden and raises unemployment if it
is used to complement a consumption tax. It is left to the reader to implement such reform
scenarios and to interpret the results economically.
VI. Conclusion
Our simulation model enables us to determine the environmental, efficiency and employment
effects of a green tax reform for different variants of the general benchmark equilibrium. It
has been shown that a sensibly designed green tax can drop three dividends simultaneously if
considered in third best worlds (and only in these). The green tax can be used to improve the
quality of the environment, the efficiency of the tax system and it can cause positive
employment effects. One should be careful, though, to generalize and apply our results to the
real world without reservation. For such purposes, our model is far too simple.
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